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Abstract
Online activities allow users to benefit from, and engage with, news and information
in a more complex way than was possible with old news settings. However, many
have expressed concerns about the effects of false news stories, or ‘fake news’,
circulated largely via online services on public view. This study examines the news
sites’ behaviour and the attitudes of elite Egyptian academics towards information
provided by the aljazeera.net news site during the Egyptian political conflict and the
transformation from former President Mohamed Morsi to current President Abdul
Fatah el-Sisi. A total of 450 elite academics were surveyed online to evaluate news
and information about the political conflict and the transformation in Egypt through
focusing on how they became informed about such news, their perceptions of news
via the aljazeera.net site and their evaluation of whether the network has misused
information regarding this period. The results indicated that the aljazeera.net site used
different, false and ‘fake news’ techniques mainly in support of the pro-Morsi position
during the transition to el-Sisi. Respondents indicated that misinformation was
clearly provided by aljazeera.net in different formats, though some highlighted the
importance of accessing news from online sources. Respondents indicated that online
content can be easily spread among users with no significant third-party filtering,
fact-checking or editorial judgment. This raises questions about who becomes the
arbiter of truth.
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1. Background
The early months of 2013 witnessed large protests against Mohamed Morsi, the fifth
President of Egypt (from 30 June 2012 to 3 July 2013) over alleged decisions that the
Egyptians considered to support Brotherhoodism over other political forces, as well as
other decisions alleged to threaten Egyptian national security (Rashdan, 2015). There
were also sectarian incidents in Abbasia, Achim and Aswan and clashes in Port Said
because of judgments against those involved in the “massacre” of Port Said Stadium,
which forced Morsi to impose a state of emergency and a curfew in the canal cities
area (Abaza, 2013). In April 2013, a movement called “Tamarod” (“Rebellion” in Ara-
bic) launched a major campaign to obtain Egyptian signatures calling for the resig-
nation of President Morsi and for early presidential elections. By June 29, 22,134,465
signatures had been collected calling for the end of the Morsi regime and a mass
protest was called to confirm the signatures (Monier and Ranko, 2013). As a result, the
Defense Minister, Abdel Fatah el-Sisi, announced on July 3 that the Egyptian Army had
ousted Morsi, that early presidential elections would be held and that a roadmap had
been established to complete the country’s constitutional institutions. In January 2014,
the new Egyptian constitution was adopted after the Supreme Elections Commission
announced the final result of the referendum and el-Sisi was elected (Kingsley, 2014;
Sanyal, 2015).
The June 30 Revolution is seen as a distinctly popular event that expressed the
wishes of the vast majority of Egyptians and it is now described as “online democracy”
which enabled the Egyptians to participate politically and to advocate the January 25
Revolution in a way that did not involve the state media (Monier and Ranko, 2013;
Rashdan, 2015). The online platforms have enabled people to express their views
openly. Following the 2013 Egyptian election, a specific concern arose related to the
effect of false stories or “fake news” circulated on news sites and the way in which
news is spread andwidely shared on these platforms. Statistically, evidence has shown
that Egyptians are now addicted to online sites which are most popular among those
aged 18-24, followed by those aged 25-34, with more males (64%) than females
(36%), for example, using Facebook on a daily basis (Cairoscene, 2014). Likewise, more
online activities now take place involving different segments of society. It is argued
that aljazeera.net became heavily involved in the period of political transformation
through giving much support to Morsi’s party, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), over
others. This is because aljazeera.net has its own agenda in dealing with such issues
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and this raises concerns over the ethical issues arising from media organisations pro-
viding accurate news and information. The network deliberately attempted to create
confusion and instability in Egypt by feeding hate and division between locals. This
study aims to examine the behaviour of elite Egyptian academics regarding informa-
tion provided by the aljazeera.net site during the political conflict and the process
of transformation between former President Mohamed Morsi and current President
Abdul Fatah el-Sisi. It examines respondents’ perceptions of the network’s news and
information during this period in order to understand online audiences’ perceptions of
misused information and “fake news” concerning Egypt.
2. Related Work
Misinformation, or “fake news”, is not a new phenomenon in modern society in terms
of threatening democracy and freedom (Zhou, Wellman and Yu, 2011; EBU, 2018). For
example, the term was highlighted by news media in coverage of Donald Trump’s
election in 2016 (Silverman and Singer-Vine, 2016; Titcomb and Carson, 2018) and the
UK’s Brexit vote in June 2016 (Briant, 2018) with concerns about the credibility of online
content being raised, especially after widespread reports of social sites sharing false
stories and allegations that “someone” paid them to do this (Wojdynski, 2016). “Fake
news” is not entirely a new phenomenon – in fact, “fake news”, or lies, biased news
and propaganda, has been known for more than a century (Chomsky, 1991). Such
phenomena appeared in the late 19th century, but were not rapidly spread – as a result,
their corrosive effect on electoral politics and democratic processes was not great due
to the lack of digital means of distribution (Wardle, 2017; Briant, 2018).
In Arab regions, “fake news” has also found its way into mainstream media, largely
through their journalists’ over-reliance on online sources or through lack of information
about an event, especially in wartime and during conflicts. For example, some well-
known mainstream media, such as Al-Jazeera TV and Al-Arabiya TV, have recently
produced false information through deliberately made-up news stories to divert the
public for various reasons, especially during and after the 2011 Arab uprisings (Buc-
cianti and el-Richani, 2015). In his book, Public Opinion, Walter Lippmann states that
we inhabit a cave of media misrepresentations and distortions of reality. As a result,
neither press nor public can discern the truth. Nigel Oakes said that “truth is for those
who don’t have ‘the balls’ to lie in order to win – citizens are reduced to levers and
tools, and value is placed only in fetishizing the levers of power” (as cited in Briant,
2018). Indeed, Winston Churchill said that “in wartime, truth is so precious that she
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should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies” and, in the US, the George W Bush
aide, Ron Suskind (2004) wrote that “we’re an empire now, and when we act, we
create our own reality”.
2.1. Types of “fake news”
To understand the current information ecosystem, three elements can be broken down
regarding misinformation or “fake news” and how these are spread via online plat-
forms, as Wardle (2017) highlights: (1) the types of content being created/shared; (2)
the motivations behind such creation/sharing; and (3) how the content is dissemi-
nated. Baym (2005: 261) adds that “fake news necessitates assumptions about some
kind of authentic or legitimate set of news practices”. This means that, when users
believe that a news site is journalistic in nature, they can be exploited and persuaded
to believe untrue things (e.g., the aljazeera.net site). Wardle (2017) further argues
that, when considering whether information is false, there are seven distinct types of
problematic content and we should think about these when viewing media content
(see e.g., Silverman and Singer-Vine, 2016). These are: (1) satire or parody where
there is no intention to cause harm, but there is potential for people to be fooled; (2)
misleading content used to frame an issue or an individual; (3) imposter content when
genuine sources are impersonated; (4) fabricated content where new content is 100%
false and designed to deceive and do harm; (5) false connections when headlines,
visuals or captions do not support the content; (6) false context when genuine content
is sharedwith false contextual information; and (7)manipulated content when genuine
information or imagery is manipulated in order to deceive.
Furthermore, the internet has hugely contributed to the proliferation of new forms
of partisan media (e.g., websites, blogs, tweets, posts) and, with the emergence and
popularity of social media sites, news partisanship has becomemore popular than ever
(Vargo, Guo and Amazeen, 2018). In some Arab countries, some politicians/religious
leaders, via their partisan media, have used false information alongside state media to
manipulate public opinion. For example, the Qatari authorities showed great support
for the MB party in Egypt due to its ideological views and allowed MB members to
use the channel as a platform with which to divert Egyptians. As a result, its one-
sided coverage and alleged bias has badly affected the channel’s reputation (Williams,
2014). To show its support for the MB party, the channel, for example, fully allowed
Yousf al-Qaradawi, a pro-MB preacher, to post his views (Smoltczyk, 2011).
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Some believe that Qatar’s Al-Jazeera has played a provocative role with the aim of
overthrowing a number of Arab regimes, implementing creative chaos, dividing the
Arab region by spreading sedition and instigating unrest in Arab countries. We argue
that aljazeera.net sets the agenda of other media outlets, newspapers, television and
radio due to its long-standing media coverage around the world. We consider that
aljazeera.net was able to construct the Egyptians’ perceived importance of intercon-
nections between issues regarding Musi or el-Sisi. However, the channel effectively
became a supporter of violent groups and this affected its media credibility in a large
number of Arab regions (e.g., Egypt). In fact, the channel possesses the potential, in
terms of material and technology, to enable it to falsify public awareness and fall into
lies and deception. The channel promotes the claims of division, e.g. in Iraq, Syria and
Libya. It uses its site to attack others, especially when its offices are closed, such as
in Syria and Egypt. It uses its own “electronic militias” to support its allied groups
(e.g., in Syria, Libya and Yemen). The channel clearly led the assault on the Egyptian
army, as confirmed by leaked documents during the January 25 Revolution where it
played a confirmed role in destroying Egypt by igniting the flames of sedition among
Egyptians and through its bias towards the MB party. These matters are of great
concern in the Arab world. This study is underpinned by the following questions: (RQ1)
How have elite Egyptian academics adapted/perceived the more diverse provision
of news information from aljazeera.net? (RQ2) Have they become more aware of
misinformation or false news from specific news services? The study reported in this
paper has provided an up-to-date analysis of online content provided by aljazeera.net,
and used by elite Egyptian academics, in an attempt to map out the way in which news
and information in the region is being perceived.
3. Method
3.1. Respondents
Data were collected from 450 elite Egyptian academics who are specialists in media
and communication studies and who teach in public/private Egyptian universities.
These were: Faculty of Mass Communication, Cairo University (public), Faculty of Infor-
mation, University of Beni Suef (public), Mass Media and Communication Technology
Faculty, South Valley University (public), Media Studies Faculty, American University
in Cairo (private), Media Studies Department, German University in Cairo (private),
Faculty of Media and Mass Communication, October 6 University (private), Faculty
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of Media and Arts, Pharos University in Alexandria (private), Faculty of Media and
Communication Technology, University of Misr for Science and Technology (private)
and Media Department, Canadian University (private). Out of 450 responses, 32 were
dropped for not completing the questionnaire, leaving the study with 418 respondents
(as shown in Table 1 below).









> 66 27 6.5
Education level
Professor 90 21.6
Asso. Professor 127 30.5
Ass. Professor 114 27.3
Lecturer 66 15.8
Ass. Lecturer 21 5.0
Specialised
Journalism 86 20.6
PR and Ads 120 28.8
TV & Radio 115 27.5





Data were gathered through an online survey, googlesurvey.com, with a questionnaire
containing a total of 13 questions. Before proceeding, it is necessary to bear in mind
that, because the data were gathered via an online survey, the generalising and the
findings are limited to those participants who voluntarily undertook the questionnaire.
The questionnaire was simply designed with questions measured on closed options.
The validity of the instrument was tested by reviewing the questions to ensure that
the words/phrases were linguistically clear.
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4. Findings
4.1. Views on news content
Respondents were generally asked about their opinion regarding news and informa-
tion content on the aljazeera.net site and whether they thought that the network
posted any misinformation about Egypt during the aforementioned period. The major-
ity of respondents (62.7%) believed that the network often posted misinformation
about Egypt, while 30.9% said that they “don’t know” or “don’t think so” (6.4%). This
is an indication that our respondents were aware of “fake news”, or fabricated news
content, posted about their country.
Respondents were also asked, more specifically, about the aljazeera.net news site’s
coverage of events and issues in Egypt from June 2013 to July 2014. A total of 34.3%
of respondents believed that aljazeera.net “betrayed” or manipulated the public with
news and information when covering the events. Some (27%) felt “very betrayed”,
while 13.6% of respondents believed that the coverage was “very objective” or “just
objective” (9.5%) in posting news and information about Egypt during this period, with
15.5% of respondents stating that they “don’t know”.
Those who believed that aljazeera.net posted “fake news” during this period were
asked how the network posted this news and information. The respondents considered
that the network was able to post “fake news” via the following: pictures (89.1%),
videos (82.2%), news sources (79.6%), links (49.5%), news stories (42.5%) and news
context (36%). Respondents also added that the network commented via news events
(38%), via social media sites (15.6%) and through selected speakers (14.4%). When
respondents were asked about the scope used by aljazeera.net to post “fake news”,
60% said that the network covered security and military news topics, 58.9% said
political news, 39% said sports news, 26.3% said economic news, 24.4% said cultural
news and 20.6% said social news. This shows that the network used a large variety
of means of spreading “fake news” or misinformation. It seems that the network
broadcasted/posted false news which was believed to harm national security, causing
the network to be subject to persecution, as Rashdan (2015) indicates.
4.2. Reasons behind misinformation news
To determine whether Egyptians were aware of the reasons behind the posting of
misinformation news, respondents were asked to indicate their agreement with six
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generally reasoned items associated with posting “fake news” about Egypt on a five-
point scale (1 = strongly agree and 5 = strongly disagree).
T 2: Different reasons for posting “fake news” (n = 417).
The network posted misinformation … SA DK SD
to support the MB party 66.9 8.2 25.0
to cause the el-Sisis election campaign to fail 64.7 9.4 25.9
to distort the Egyptian internal image 62.9 11.5 25.6
to distort the Egyptian external image 62.8 11.5 25.7
because of the network’s policy of distorting and
counterfeiting news
61.9 11.3 26.9
because its nature to post misinformation news 60.9 12.2 26.9
The findings show that most respondents were in agreement about the network
posting “fake news” about Egypt. For example, the majority (saying “agree strongly”
or “agree”) of respondents said that they believed that the channel posted “fake news”
for the following reasons: to support the MB (66.9%); to cause the el-Sisi election
campaign to fail (64.7%); to distort Egypt’s external image (62.9%) or internal image
(62.9%); it is the nature of the network to post “fake news” about Egypt (61.9%); the
network has a policy of distorting and counterfeiting news (60.9%).
Figure 1: Most words/phases mentioned regarding misinformation news about Egypt.
Finally, respondents were asked to write three words/phrases that came into
their minds when talking about “fake news” about Egypt (Figure 1). Most of the
words/phrases mentioned by the respondents were: “army/military” (40%), fol-
lowed by “coup/legitimacy” (16.7%), “President Morsi” and “the legitimate president”
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(15.8%) and “the police, security and intelligence” (13.5%). Less frequently used
words were: “el-Sisi” (8%), “Egyptian media” (5.8%), “poverty” (4.7%) and “religious
institutions/al-azhar” or “Church” (3.2%). Al-Jazeera here seems to focus on the
media elite in its misinformation news about the sovereign institutions in Egypt such
as the army, security, the elected president (el-Sisi) and other media and religious
institutions.
5. Discussion
In response to RQ1, an online survey of elite Egyptian academics, which investigated
news sites and fake news information in the Egyptian political transformation of 2013-
14, provided evidence that news information content provided by some news sites,
such as aljazeera.net, was described as false and as misinformation. There is no doubt
that the internet, via news sites, has been widely patronised by Arabs and it is clear
that widespread use of such news sites to access news and information stories about
Egypt has allowed such news stories to be disseminated quickly, with reports that
the majority of Egyptians get news and information via different platforms such as
aljazeera.net (Dennis, Martin and Wood, 2016). Respondents also indicated that the
network somehow “betrayed”, or attempted to manipulate, the public about the polit-
ical situation.
Focusing on news information delivered by aljazeera.net, the study found that the
network superseded indigenous local and national Egyptianmedia services by creating
and taking part in producing news and information about the political situation in Egypt
during this period and supporting the MB party (RQ2). In doing so, the network used
different materials to post false news about Egypt, such as pictures, video clips, news
sources, news links and news stories, with the specific intention of competing with the
local media. However, the local authorises were able to control the flow of information
and refuted information about Egypt posted by aljazeera.net. The network also used
a wide scope to post misinformation news about Egypt. For example, it used security
and military news topics, political news, sports news and economic news. Such news
and information posted on the network was seen as a threat and as harmful to national
security, which caused the network to be shut down (Rashdan, 2015).
The reasons for aljazeera.net postingmisinformation about Egypt in the same period
are clear. As indicated by the respondents, support for the MB party, the desire for the
el-Sisis campaign to fail and the desire to alter Egypt’s internal/external image were
the most cited rationales behind misinformation news. This indicates that the Egyptian
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elites were fully aware of the types of news and information posted by the network.
Three factors could be at play. First, the views of the network and its news content
were easily identified as misinformation and false news. Second, the manipulated
content lacked strong supporting evidence. Third, the Egyptian elites were fully aware
of the media fabrication and of how news could be produced to divert and influence
audiences.
Several words/phrases were mentioned by the respondents regarding misinforma-
tion news posted by the network covering the news and information about Egypt. The
words/phrases most used were “army/military”, followed by using “coup/legitimacy”
and words mentioning President Morsi as being the legitimate president. This can
be seen as interference in the local affairs of Egypt and as an outrage by the new
government of el-Sisi.
6. Conclusion
Since late 2010, news sites have been seen as important tools in mobilising and organ-
ising Egyptian users throughout the uprising (Dennis, Martin and Wood, 2016, 2017).
Their impact suggests that those concerned with the quest for democracy and peace
should pay more attention to the explicit and implicit effects of these social media
(Zhou, Wellman and Yu, 2011). “Fake news” is seen as stories that are generally false
or fabricated. However, such news became very popular at certain times e.g., during
elections and wars. “Fake news” is the most visible element in the online information
disorder in which e.g., some social media have huge influence on users’ access to
information (EBU, 2018). News stories range from hoaxes and propaganda to disin-
formation purporting to be real news, which now frequently circulate more on new
media (social media) to drive web traffic and amplify their effect. Some stories are
seen as completely false and created for financial, religious and political gains (Wardle,
2017). News and current affairs are central to public-service media and are seen as an
essential element in informing the public and helping them to understand the world
around them. This means offering a wide choice of quality news and information,
impartial information and pluralistic views.
With the emergence and popularity of accessing news and information via the inter-
net, news sites’ coverage became more popular among Egyptians than it had ever
been before (Vargo, Guo and Amazeen, 2018). However, the internet, via news sites,
facilitates the spread of misinformation which targets users already engaged in con-
versation on a particular issue (e.g., the ousting of Morsi). This study has shown that
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participants indicated that aljazeera.net posted false news in a professional manner
to support the Morsi campaign against el-Sisi during 2013 and 2014. The importance
of these findings is that the participants were able to identify the concept of “fake
news” or misinformation news when they referred to the content that is fabricated for
political direction and intention or for ideological views. They were also aware of the
widespread use of news and information via the internet and networking sites and of
the ability of users to get access to a huge quantity of information without gatekeep-
ers or filters. This means that users have to fast-check and find true information for
themselves and trust those news sources that they perceive to be credible, as Flanagin
and Metzger (2000) indicate.
Despite the recent hostility and disagreement between Al-Jazeera and the Egyp-
tian authorities, the network has been working intensively on different Egyptian mat-
ters and has tried to interfere with the public and influence them on every aspect
of Egyptian life and current affairs. Regarding the period analysed here, the study
found that the relationship between Egypt and Al-Jazeera has become a negative one.
The network lost its main office in Cairo due to allegations of producing and trying to
manipulate Egyptians about what is going on in their country. The lack of objective
news and use of political propaganda affected the network’s reputation among local
people. This could help the local media to fill the gap and to replace the news and
information coming from aljazeera.net. In fact, it seems that the Egyptian media were
strong enough to refute aljazeera.net’s news and information, especially during this
period.
To sum up, although this paper has provided amore recent analysis of online content
provided by aljazeera.net, its findings should be considered in light of its limitations.
For example, the study was conducted at a time when there was popular discussion
in Egypt about misinformation news and false news and this could have influenced
the outcome. The raising of the “fake news” issue in Egypt regarding the political
transformation could have affected public debate and the subsequent survey findings.
Second, participants (in the survey and interviews) could have misremembered or
tailored their responses in a way that would paint them in a favourable light. This
paper identified news and information provided only by aljazeera.net to determine
how news and information was being perceived by Egyptian elites only. Future work
could explore more in terms of both news sites and population.
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